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Abstract 
 This thesis evaluates whether or not information data sharing is effectively used between 
federal, state, and local government agencies and non-governmental agencies in a metropolitan 
area during and immediately after a major natural disaster.  Also, whether vulnerable populations 
were identified and considered during emergency management. The chosen study area is the City 
of Richmond, VA, and the disaster response is based on flooding episodes that occurred in the 
city over the last decade following hurricanes and tropical depressions.  Questionnaires were 
administered to representatives of federal, state, and local agencies and NGOs. The 
questionnaires consisted of a Likert-style series of 10 questions and a group of more broadly 
based and open ended questions that were administered in person or by phone and included four 
questions designed to identify progress made since the last disaster. The self-administered 
Likert-style of questions consisted of identifying agency planning and operational activity, 
interaction with other agencies, means for data collection, use of FEMA’s Partnership Guides, 
and communication with the public.  These questions were also designed to identify the agency 
activity in each of the four major areas of emergency management, namely mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery.  In general there appears to be good lines of 
communication, co-operation, and interaction between agencies based on the concept that 
disaster management is a local issue and only involves the state and federal governments in cases 
of very severe disasters.  Consistent with this was the fact that there was essentially no use of the 
FEMA Partnership Guide by state and local agencies.  GIS capacity is generally good, as is data 
sharing via a number of methods, including regular meetings.  A variety of methods are used to 
inform the general public, including reverse 911, radio, television and social networks although 
vulnerable populations may have difficult accessing some of these. 
 
viii 
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I. Introduction 
Background 
 This thesis evaluates whether or not information data sharing is effectively used between 
government agencies such as the Virginia Department of Emergency Management and non-
governmental organizations such as the American Red Cross in a metropolitan area during and 
immediately after a major natural disaster.  The chosen study area is the City of Richmond, VA. 
 Natural disasters appear to be a growing concern for humanity as both climate change 
and population growth affects the planet.  “Natural hazards are defined as those particular hazard 
events that arise from geophysical processes or biological agents and affect the lives, livelihood, 
or the property of the public (Gallant, 2008, p.41).”  Rising sea levels and human development 
are reducing or eliminating the natural barriers that protect communities. Most often, developing 
countries or even poor communities in developed nations experience mass tragedies and long-
term suffering due in part to natural disasters.  Evidence shows that the poor are more vulnerable 
during all stages of a catastrophic event (Flanagan, et. Al, 2011). Earthquakes, tsunamis, 
cyclones, hurricanes, tornadoes, fires, and flooding can result in sequential catastrophic events, 
further confounding the plight of already affected areas.  Human and economic impact caused by 
natural disasters can devastate communities so extensively that they may never recover. 
 The United States became more aware of the magnitude of devastation that a natural 
disaster can produce after Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Gulf Coast in 2005.  Such a 
catastrophic event affecting several states had not been seen in recent years. According to 
Stanley Goldberg, a hurricane researcher with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), “major storms powering annually from the tropics have more than 
doubled since 1995 under the influence of favorable winds and higher water temperatures in the  
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Atlantic… (while) the newly stormy hurricane seasons could threaten the East Coast for the next 
decade or for the next four decades (Bacque, P., September 23, 2004, p. B-1).” 
 At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
had been absorbed into the United States Department of Homeland Security after the events of 
September 11, 2001.  The focus had shifted from disaster preparedness to terrorism, diminishing 
FEMA’s role in helping build direct relationships with state and local responders (Cigler, 2007).  
The loss of life and economic destruction unveiled by the media, left many Americans asking 
how could a well-predicted storm leave so many people isolated without necessities days after 
the event, why did economically disadvantaged individuals appear to be suffering 
disproportionately, and who was responsible for assisting these communities.   
 Katrina was the first large-scale disaster to test the NRP (National Response Plan) and 
NIMS (National Incident Management System), created in 2003 (Col, 2007).  Foundations of the 
NRP is the NIMS, providing ‘a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local 
governments to work effectively and efficiently to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
domestic incidents…To provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, and 
local capabilities (Walsh, et. Al, 2005, p.4).’  Although such directives were in place in 2005, the 
system failed at all levels. Therefore, following Katrina, emergency management was evaluated 
differently and seen as an all-encompassing practice in need of reform. 
 From an evaluation of exiting literature, interviews with members of the emergency 
management community, and identification of vulnerable populations, suggestions can be made 
to better serve the residents of Richmond before, during, and after an event. Particularly, content 
analysis of the in-depth interviewee responses with key agency stakeholders will identify if 
improvements can be made within an emergency management scenario.  Interview analyses will 
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compose the primary source of research from which to base any suggestions.  However, analysis 
of existing documents, such as news articles or interviews, will also be implemented during the 
research process.  Based on the experiences of the 2003, 2004, and 2006 Richmond floods, 
shortcomings in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery will be identified and attempts 
will be made to determine what has been learned by the responsible agencies to avoid similar 
mistakes in the future. 
Research Objectives 
 At a local level, it is important to identify how Federal, State, and city officials along 
with NGOs and the private-sector prepare for and handle a disastrous event, while taking into 
account the needs of socially vulnerable individuals and/or communities.  Similarly, how do such 
various agencies and organizations work together to better serve the community so that 
redundancy or deficiency of services does not occur?  The efficiency and rate at which relief is 
administered is due in part to the collaboration of the responsible agencies and organizations, and 
is primarily based on communication of resource availability and aid response.  Without a clear 
picture of what task each stakeholder is responsible for, time may simply be wasted in providing 
the help that is so desperately needed.  This research focuses on the involvement of the various 
governmental agencies and NGOs during the four phases of emergency management, the extent 
to which data are shared among key stakeholders, what types of data are crucial for responders 
and planners, and whether suggestions may be made to increase successful collaborative efforts 
between government agencies and NGOs. Implicit in this evaluation is the identification of lines 
of authority, communication, and responsibility among the involved agencies. 
 This thesis evaluates whether or not information data sharing is effectively used between 
government agencies such as the Virginia Department of Emergency Management and non-
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governmental organizations such as the American Red Cross in a metropolitan area during and 
immediately after a major natural disaster.  The various activities that are evaluated have been 
divided into the four areas of disaster management, namely mitigation, preparedness, response 
and recovery, and the study model that has been chosen is the City of Richmond during and 
following a disastrous surface-flooding event.  The following three objectives are the proposed 
aim of the research conducted. 
1) Illustrate the problem that may currently exist in emergency management regarding 
flooding in Richmond, Virginia and the impact this may have on vulnerable populations.   
 
2) Examine preparedness and response by Federal, State, local agencies, and NGOs in order 
to identify missing links that might prevent hardship in already vulnerable areas.  
 
3) Provide recommendations for future emergency management practices so that minimal 
effects to communities may occur.  
 
Value of research 
 As a professional planner, I believe that it is important to consider all members of a 
community and to design their community so that it is safe and viable. Urban planners are 
assigned the task of providing insight into the built environment, but it is during the recovery 
phase where they figure most prominently.  Neglecting the other three phases of emergency 
management cannot benefit the process as a whole.  Therefore, I feel that it is vital that planners 
assess the risks of a community while proposing its design because if such considerations are 
taken into account prior to a natural disaster, the potential for significantly less destruction exists.   
 There is frequently a lack of communication between agencies during the response and 
recovery phases after a disaster, which exacerbates the potential for further loss of life and 
extends human suffering.  The key to expediting aid post-disaster is to have an accurate and clear 
picture of the community pre-disaster. Community involvement is necessary to document and 
understand the lives of its members, the impact of any natural disaster on the community, and the 
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feasibility and aspirations of the affected individuals for their future recovery.  Governmental 
and non-governmental agencies assume the bulk of the response and recovery activities in any 
natural disaster, and while communication and collaboration between agencies is often effective 
during the response stage of a disaster, this is not always the case in the planning for the 
subsequent recovery. 
  Post-Katrina, across the country, Federal and local officials have identified where 
failures occurred or might be expected to occur in other communities, whether during 
preparedness or through the recovery process.  Resulting in a multitude of plans that have been 
devised to better serve communities in the event of a disaster.  Vast literature exists identifying 
how a lack of coordination, collaboration, and communication exacerbated the devastation and 
loss of life for those living along the Gulf coast region.  Localities have taken into account 
federally mandated statutes when planning for their communities.  As more natural disasters 
occur in the United States, localities are learning best practices either from past experiences in 
their community or from similar disasters that have occurred elsewhere.    
Ultimately, the scope of the disaster dictates the response and aid warranted for the 
community.  However, financial limitations dictate where and how assistance is to be 
administered. Whether federal funding from FEMA is available or financial and humanitarian 
aid is available from national and/or local NGOs and faith-based organizations, limitations exist 
as to the amount of assistance that is readily available. Traditionally, in affected communities 
long-term recovery has often been left to the insurance industry, unless Federal, State or local 
agencies have property buy-out plans as part of a larger remediation or redevelopment program.  
The situation is more uncertain in vulnerable, older, and lower socioeconomic communities 
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where the lack of property insurance limits assistance from for-profit private sector insurers, as 
was the case for the New Orleans fourth ward.  
 Numerous players of various backgrounds are involved during the emergency 
management process.  “The field and profession of emergency management have been evolving 
into a more collaborative enterprise, while the transformation has gradually moved beyond the 
classic top-down bureaucratic model to become a more dynamic and flexible network model that 
facilitates multi-organizational, intergovernmental, and inter-sectoral cooperation. (Waugh and 
Streib, 2006, p.131).” While each nation, region, and disaster is unique, many of the problems 
encountered, and perhaps the solutions, share some commonality with the subject of this 
proposal. “To reduce the vulnerability of places (and people) to the risk of natural disasters, the 
objectives of spatial planning and the pattern of cooperation among local, regional, and national 
levels of government may need to be changed (Konvitz, 2004, p. 69).” 
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II. Literature Review 
 
 The purpose of this study is to assess whether lines of communication, leadership, and 
information sharing are effectively open and utilized among agencies that assist before, during, 
and after a disaster.  Considerable literature exists to support the need for open lines of 
communication that will promote collaboration between governmental agencies and NGOs.  
More recently, media coverage of unprecedented natural disasters in recent years has brought the 
nation’s attention to the resulting overwhelming devastation.  Urban and rural areas with large 
concentrations of population are likely to suffer extensive damage lending support to the 
importance of preparedness, response, and recovery.  Lessons have been identified, if not 
learned, regarding the breakdown of community preparedness and agency interaction.   
 The following literature review concentrates on four major components to establishing a 
successful response and recovery while taking appropriate preventive measures to avoid disaster 
devastation.  Since Hurricane Katrina was and remains to be the event for which most 
evaluations of policy and practice have been conducted in the United States, the literature is 
primarily based upon the Gulf Coast region’s emergency management successes and shortfalls. 
 The lessoned learned after Katrina provide a valuable basis for the future of emergency 
management and planning.  Most often, such lessons focus on the importance of communication, 
collaboration, and information sharing while clearly identifying the key stakeholders and what 
role each should play during the process.  Conceivably, the skills of urban planners should be 
considered and therefore integrated into the emergency management field, especially before a 
disaster occurs.  By doing so, community development in a potentially hazardous environment 
may be deterred or even prevented.  “Poorly planned, narrowly defined, and inadequately 
executed development practices themselves can increase the likelihood and the effects of a 
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disaster, directly influencing and shaping disaster risk (Oviatt and Brett, 2010, p. 54).”  Finally, 
the technologies currently available which emergency managers and planners have access to and 
employ provide valuable tools that can only benefit the process.  The following literature review 
takes into account these four concepts to support the idea that emergency management is an 
integrated process that should take full advantage of the tools available. 
Lessons Learned Post-disaster: Best practices for Emergency Management  
 First, a definition describing the four phases of emergency management is provided. 
Emergency management is the field of study associated with disasters, whether manmade or 
natural.  The field of emergency management is defined by the four phases of mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. According to Brian Gallant and Jeanne-Marie Col  
(Gallant, 2008, p. 20 and Col, 2007, p.115): 
Mitigation includes efforts to prevent manmade or natural disasters by the assessment of threats 
to the community, reducing or eliminating such threat to people and property.  
Preparedness is the state of readiness to respond to a disaster through planning, resource 
allocation, and training of individuals through response exercises.  
Response includes public donations, incident management, coordination, search and rescue 
operations, damage assessments, and handling of fatalities, while meeting basic human needs. 
Recovery involves decisions and actions regarding cleaning up, the reinstitution of public 
services, the rebuilding of public infrastructure, and all that is necessary to help restore civic life, 
including disaster assistance and crisis counseling. 
 As previously mentioned, Hurricane Katrina was the major disastrous event in the United 
States for which the emergency management field realized problems existed in planning and 
practice. From the federal, state, and local levels of government, failures occurred in relaying 
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pertinent information, establishing a clear plan for evacuation, providing a speedy and thorough 
response, and ultimately planning for the reconstruction of towns and cities along the Gulf Coast 
(Olshansky and Johnson, 2010).  The President issued federal disaster declarations for a number 
of states including Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana (U.S. GAO, March 8, 2006).  According 
to the White House, in 2006 the overall cost of Katrina was estimated at nearly $100 billion.  
After this disaster, professionals of emergency management and planning came forward to draft 
new plans based on the breakdown witnessed, so that future events would not produce such 
catastrophic results.   
 Although the system may have failed to some degree throughout each of the four phases 
of emergency management during Katrina, government officials and NGOs have sought to 
rectify and better prepare for any disastrous event, regardless of magnitude.  The importance of 
communication and collaboration was cited as a shortcoming when aid was immediately needed 
(Fischer, 2008).  An effective basis for developing a disaster plan is to determine the 
effectiveness of pre- and post-disaster planning in the same or similar community previously 
exposed to a natural disaster.  In this manner, procedures can be applicable to variously sized 
communities and vulnerable populations can be identified prior to an event where resources can 
already be in place to allow communities to make a quick recovery. “Effectively addressing 
social vulnerability decreases both human suffering and the economic loss related to providing 
social services and public assistance after a disaster (Flanagan, et al.2011 p.1).”  Because of the 
diversity seen at all levels in every community across the country, from geography and 
population to governance, a one size fits all template for all disaster planning is probably not 
feasible.   
 By all accounts, the Gulf Coast region and particularly New Orleans was an area where 
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the occurrence of a major disaster was merely a matter of time.  By 2000, the majority of the 
city’s population (62 percent) resided below sea level, exacerbating vulnerability (Campanella, 
2007).  In 2005, the hurricane protection system for Louisiana, consisting of 350 miles of levees 
and floodwalls, remained incomplete due to design delays, environmental concerns, and funding 
cuts (Olshansky and Johnson, 2010).  Once Katrina made landfall over Louisiana on August 29, 
2005, the storm remained a category 3 Hurricane with constant rain and battering winds topping 
120 mph (NOAA).  The lack of provisions in place resulted in nearly 1,800 deaths and over 
300,000 properties damaged (White House 2006). 
 Problems arose for New Orleans as Katrina neared, causing Mayor Ray Nagin to issue a 
mandatory evacuation for the nearly 100,000 remaining residents just one day before the storm 
was predicted to hit (Olshansky and Johnson, 2010).  Evacuation was slow and those without 
personal transportation were left to fend for themselves (Keifer and Montjoy, 2006).  Media 
coverage merely exacerbated the situation by highlighting the lack of assistance that was being 
administered.  The suffering of stranded residents was brandished throughout all media outlets, 
while much of the anguish continued not only immediately after the hurricane hit, but has 
continued for years.   
 Many believe that a human injustice occurred since the majority of the population 
displaced was already socially and economically vulnerable (Webb, 2009).  Communities 
typically become vulnerable when network capacity deteriorates and outside resources are 
unavailable (Waugh and Streib, 2006).  As was the case during Hurricane Katrina, “poor 
minorities had decreased ability to cope during the disaster, and after, they had less access to 
government services that could speed recovery (Cigler, 2007, p.67).”  However, effectively 
addressing social vulnerability has the potential to decrease both human suffering and economic 
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loss related to providing social services and public assistance only after a disaster occurs 
(Flanagan et al., 2011). 
 When Katrina occurred, the city lacked a comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance 
was outdated according to the New Orleans Planning Assessment Team, which meant that when 
the city had to rebuild, it also had to invent a new planning process (Olshansky, et al. 2008).  
Due to the mandatory evacuation order issued by area officials, most planners in the public and 
private sector evacuated.  Once officials returned, damage assessment and recovery planning was 
the priority.  Yolanda Rodriquez, the director of the New Orleans Planning Commission during 
this time and presently, was tasked with the order to work alongside FEMA on details of the 
city’s public assistance program and to revise the area’s hazard mitigation plan so the city could 
qualify for federal mitigation funding (Becker, 2010).   
 At this time, FEMA and the state initiated the Long-Term Community Recovery 
Emergency Support Function (ESF-14) as part of the National Response Plan (Olshansky, et al. 
2008). ESF-14 was created to provide technical assistance by helping communities plan for and 
identify resources necessary for recovery (U.S. GAO, July 2009).  Unfortunately, most of the 
planning commission’s staff had decreased significantly post-Katrina since the city’s revenue 
diminished and ESF-14 had never been implemented for such a large-scale disaster.  FEMA’s 
proposed process to prioritize a list of recovery projects was ultimately unsuccessful, “because of 
the scale of damage, the lack of municipal employees, and the absence of an agreed-upon 
planning process with which to create project lists (Olshansky, et al. 2008, p. 275).”   
 Nonetheless, numerous other factors have also been attributed to the failure of response 
and recovery during the emergency management process.  FEMA has received the bulk of 
responsibility for the loss of life and the lack of assistance since the federal government is 
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assumed to be the lead authority for major disasters of all sorts.  However, “the primary legal and 
political responsibility for dealing with most disasters normally resides with state and local 
officials (Waugh and Streib, 2006, p.136).”  In response to the failures of Katrina, the 109th 
Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Act of 2006, which reorganized the DHS, reconfiguring 
FEMA (effective March 31, 2007), ‘with consolidated emergency management functions, 
elevated status within the department, and enhanced organizational autonomy (Bea, et al. 2006, 
p.6).’  As part of the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA established two new positions and one entity 
including; ‘a Disability Coordinator, a Small State and Rural Advocate, and a National Advisory 
Council […] [In addition] at the regional level, the Act provides for the creation of Regional 
Advisory Councils, Regional Office Strike Teams, and regional Emergency Communications 
Coordination Working Groups (Bea et al. 2006, p.7).’ 
 Although Hurricane Katrina sheds light as to what can and likely will go wrong during a 
natural disaster, there may be no way of knowing if the federal government in conjunction with 
states and localities can handle an event of such magnitude, until it happens again.  
Collaboration and Communication among Stakeholders 
 A major component for successful disaster management is coordination among 
stakeholders.  “Coordination means more than providing information about what is 
happening…[It] means that all stakeholders are informed about and allowed to participate in the 
process (Phillips, 2009, p.64).”  Recognition of stakeholders includes those affected by the 
disaster and the NGOs and governmental emergency agencies involved in the disaster process.  
From the national level (FEMA), to the state level (VA Department of Emergency Management), 
down to the regional aid organizations providing assistance (Red Cross), communication should 
be the priority. As Jonathan Walters and Donald Kettl (2005) observed when Hurricane Katrina 
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hit New Orleans, the intergovernmental relationship that was supposed to connect local, state, 
and federal officials before, during, and after such a catastrophe had disintegrated (Kiefer and 
Montjoy, 2006).  Once again, FEMA was and remains to be at the top of the hierarchal 
emergency management network even when state and local officials perform most of the tasks 
required during each phase of emergency management. 
 However, as noted in a report by the United States Government Accountability Office, 
“FEMA has assisted state and local governments in developing post-disaster recovery plans in 
various ways, which in turn can help facilitate collaboration among stakeholders (U.S. GAO, 
July 2009, p.15).”  FEMA has established a Long-Term Community Recovery Self Help 
Response Partner Guide for the private sector, the state, and the federal level of government.  
However, the extent to which they are followed is undeterminable.  Addressing how the federal 
agency maintains and effectively shares data in order to better serve those affected is key in 
confirming the use of GIS and other forms of information technology for informing the public, 
allocating disaster services, planning for community reconstruction.  Similarly, information 
sharing web sites cannot produce the same results as direct communication when learning from 
experiences.  Most notably, a disconnection may emerge at the federal level from the 
communities it is trying to assist.  Local capacities are not assessed and the public must navigate 
through bureaucratic policies in order to actually receive assistance (Ganapti, 2009; Chamblee-
Wright, 2007).   
 As suggested by Cigler, ‘cooperative partnerships’ within the network, involve more than 
information sharing, “but not a substantial commitment of resources or a reduction in autonomy 
(Kiefer and Montjoy, 2006, p.125).”  Apparently, problems with command and control systems 
exist because of the lack of situational awareness, resulting in poor communication among 
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officials and decision makers (Waugh and Streib, 2006).  Hence, effective communication of 
information and knowledge is key to ensuring all those involved from various levels of authority, 
to emergency services, and the public will have a common understanding and can jointly 
implement each phase of managing an urban flood disaster (Price and Vojinovic, 2008).   
 Trust among the agencies involved is also pertinent so that open lines of communication 
may be established and collaboration instituted (Kiefer and Montjoy, 2006).  Therefore, state and 
local agencies will not only take advantage of community volunteer organizations, but in turn, 
such groups will act in accordance with understood mandates to expedite the recovery phase.  
Similarly, emergency management personnel need plans that will help them anticipate 
contingencies, assess developments, and direct effective response and recovery operations 
(Gunes and Kovel, 2000).   Since many organizations will play some role during the disaster 
process, establishing and maintaining necessary linkages is difficult, but necessary.  
Collaborative capacity building amongst the nation’s disaster networks is critical and may occur 
through frequent interaction, including participation in planning and training exercises (Waugh 
and Streib, 2006). 
 One example of successful partnerships that was effectual for Louisiana’s recovery 
process was the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA), established by the state’s governor.  “The 
LRA adopted principles and policies for local redevelopment and established a long-range 
planning taskforce, which oversaw the Louisiana Speaks regional planning process (Olshansky, 
et al. 2008, p. 275).”  Planning professionals from around the country embarked on the mission 
of rebuilding communities better than they were prior to Katrina.  Existing NGOs and newly 
established volunteer organizations also played a pivotal role in aiding residents and creating 
social networks to re-establish some sense of normalcy. Volunteers were invaluable during all 
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phases of disaster management, proving to be crucial contributors possessing resources or 
expertise not otherwise available (Rao, et. Al, 2007).  Ultimately, the effectiveness of the 
proposed plans was dependent on the capacity and commitment of the implementing 
organizations that included both governmental and nongovernmental networks (Kiefer and 
Montjoy, 2006). 
The Role of Urban Planners during the Disaster Process 
 Urban planners are often seen as educators, facilitators, and/or advocates during 
community development.  Of the four phases of disaster management, planners play a vital role 
during mitigation, using their knowledge of zoning enforcement and building code requirements, 
and recovery, by working with the community to assess fundamental livelihood requirements 
during the rebuilding process.  As it appears, planners are not necessarily involved during 
disaster preparedness and response.  Although planning professionals may not possess the 
expertise to assist in these two phases, their knowledge applied during mitigation and recovery 
can help to ameliorate the effects of a natural disaster.  However, if disaster planners embrace the 
concept that recovery is a process of decision-making that is part of a continuum…recovery 
planning should therefore commence at the same time any disaster response commences (Becker 
et al. 2011). 
 Long-term disaster recovery has become of escalating importance due to the increasing 
devastation of the urban environment. Although states play a pivotal role as capacity builders 
through information generation and propagation of data to local governments and citizens, such a 
regulatory role can facilitate wise local action (Cigler, 2007). Leadership needs may vary while 
emergency management presents a different set of challenges than response. Mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery are essentially intertwined (Waugh and Streib, 2006).  In 
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addition, “local emergency managers are increasingly collaborating with building code, urban 
planning, and other officials who can help reduce risks (Waugh and Streib, 2006, p.134).” 
Olshansky stresses that planning is critical to mitigate the effects of disaster, stating that those 
mitigation tools include, “development review procedures, citing guidelines, area hazard studies, 
building codes, engineering structures, public purchase, and strategies to relocate, strengthen, or 
otherwise modify existing structures (Olshansky, “Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery, p. 134).”  
Therefore, urban planning should be integrated throughout the process.   
 Recovery is often linked to economic and social development (Waugh and Streib, 2006).  
However, if a planning group were in place as part of preparedness for a disaster, new ideas 
could be generated and integrated into the reconstruction process quickly with community 
consensus (Phillips, 2009).  There are no quick fixes for those who are displaced, but the role of 
planners working to rebuild the community is key. Planners may be involved immediately 
following a disaster, when temporary housing is required, and later if sustainable community 
development is to be attained.  Recovery is a long process of restoring individual and community 
functioning (Chandra and Acosta, 2009).  By creating an environment where principles of 
sustainability are adopted, many factors that need to be addressed during recovery will have 
already been considered. “A sustainable community is more inclusive and potentially more 
resilient to disasters” Becker et al, 2011, p. 529). 
 Initial planning involvement during community development aids in diminishing the risk 
of vulnerability to hazards.  GIS is simply one tool professionals use to evaluate whether the land 
designated for development is viable.  Planners often work closely with community members 
when researching community needs through a series of public meetings, surveys, and focus 
groups.  Heads of local community organizations work with the planning body to ensure the 
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public is fully educated as to what will take place.  According to the study conducted by The 
Rand Corporation, “NGOs can strengthen social networks by enhancing connections between 
residents and community organizations […] [and] are permanent fixtures in the community, they 
can also work on an ongoing basis (Chandra and Acosta, 2009, p.4).”  Again, evidence 
substantiates that planners should work collectively with these organizations both before and 
after a disaster occurs. 
The Importance of Data Sharing Tools  
 The means by which data are shared among agencies is just as important as stressing the 
need for increased communication that will result in network collaboration.  
Various information technologies (IT) have the potential for an even greater impact on 
enhancing disaster management across all phases, “provided it is used consistent[ly] with the 
knowledge of hazards, disasters, and disaster management practices that has been gained from 
the diverse range of disciplines that contribute to that knowledge base (Rao, et. Al 2007, p. 22).”    
 Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are one such technology that planners and 
emergency management officials use. Since GIS is becoming more readily used in the field of 
planning, it appears to be an excellent source for data sharing throughout the disaster phases.  
Some research has been undertaken regarding the capabilities and impediments to using 
platforms such as GIS for prevention management before a disaster.  However, GIS is not 
typically used after the catastrophic event to address the needs of a particular community.   For a 
successful disaster management, one would expect effective information management to be in 
place. Because the rescue window may be small, emergency officials need to have ready access 
to all necessary types of information if they are to respond effectively to all phases of a disaster 
in the most efficient and effective manner (Farris, et al., 2006).  Similarly, Gunes and Kovel 
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suggest that emergency management personnel, “need plans that help them anticipate 
contingencies, assess developments, and direct effective response and recovery operations 
(Gunes and Kovel, 2000, p.137).”  One way to obtain information and assess the current 
situation is by implementing the use of GIS and other technologies in a collaborative and 
cooperative manner.  
 GIS has the potential to be a very powerful tool in emergency management.  Such 
technology captures and stores digitized scanned data, imagery, or aerial photography, allowing 
it to be manipulated, subjected to queries, modeled and analyzed, and most importantly 
visualized. Thus GIS technology readily allows the user to integrate, manage, store, process, and 
output geographic information (Gunes and Kovel, 2000).  This technology allows different 
scenarios to be proposed and evaluated.  In order to facilitate the system’s usefulness, data must 
be up-to-date and information should be readily available to all organizations. Having such data 
available is not in itself sufficient. Personnel need to be trained in accessing, interpreting and 
using the system. 
 Today, several related technologies such as GPS, remote sensing, wireless 
communications, and the Internet are converging to strengthen and extend the capabilities of GIS 
(Drummond and French, 2008).  Companies and agencies are also creating new software to work 
simultaneously with current GIS applications. For instance, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) worked with the GIS application company ESRI to produce E3R (Emergency 
Response and Risk Reduction).   The software was developed, “to provide an easy to use and 
responsive graphic interface of dynamically produced maps of key community characteristics 
and auxiliary databases containing information relevant to risk assessment and emergency 
response […] the application can be used to describe geospatially the physical, infrastructure, 
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economic, and social characteristics of the city important for risk assessment and response and 
most importantly to do so in scenario queries (Ferris, et al. 2006, pp.429-430).”  Such 
relationships between government agencies and software companies should continue to advance 
the resources available during a disaster.  Planners need to become familiar with these new 
geospatial technologies and determine how they can be used to support planning activities in 
general (Drummond and French, 2008). 
 Although collaboration between agencies and tech companies will improve existing 
software, problems such as the ability to transfer data may arise essentially rendering the 
software useless during an active disaster.  Data availability, accuracy, and suitability may be 
abundant, but utilization of the system poor.  Most GIS-based disaster research emphasizes 
spatial data issues such as accuracy, scale and detail, analysis and modeling rather than 
implementation issues which are clearly the major impediment (Zerger and Smith, 2003).  
“Integrating disaster planning efforts across private and public IT systems that embrace diversity 
and redundancy could lead to significant improvements in the overall reliability of information 
and communications capabilities in the event of a disaster (Rao et. Al, 2007, p.92).” 
 Not only is GIS a useful tool for disaster management, but other forms of IT are used to 
relay information regarding warnings, resource allocation, and volunteer inventory.  Public 
media and the Internet are very useful if infrastructure is not affected.  Both before and after 
Hurricane Katrina local newspapers, radio and television stations, and various web sites carried 
information to the public, which was the unrepresented partner in the collaboration process 
(Kiefer and Montjoy, 2006).  
 FEMA, too, created the Long-Term Recovery Assessment Tool to help communities 
analyze the impacts of a disaster while taking into consideration the local government’s capacity 
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to assist in promoting its own long-term recovery.  The assessment tool was designed to help 
federal decision makers identity the type and level of supplemental long-term community 
recovery assistance that may be needed for full recovery from a disaster… also including 
processes and procedures, community evaluation protocols, standard planning templates, staffing 
strategies, and timetables for various levels of effort (U.S. GAO 2009).  FEMA’s Lessons 
Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) website is another source for communicating to the 
emergency management field information regarding resolutions.  Unfortunately, only registered 
professionals in the field are permitted access.  Such exclusion precludes any insight that may 
come from the grassroots level of community organizations directly involved throughout the 
process.    
Summary 
 Disasters are typically associated with the emergency management profession.  
Nevertheless, numerous players of various backgrounds are involved during the emergency 
management process.  “The field and profession of emergency management have been evolving 
into a more collaborative enterprise, while the transformation has gradually moved beyond the 
classic top-down bureaucratic model to become a more dynamic and flexible network model that 
facilitates multi-organizational, intergovernmental, and inter-sectoral cooperation. (Waugh and 
Streib, 2006, p.131).” While each nation, region, and disaster are unique, many of the problems 
encountered, and perhaps the solutions, share some commonality with the proposed 
recommendations and possible limitations of this proposal. “To reduce the vulnerability of places 
(and people) to the risk of natural disasters, the objectives of spatial planning and the pattern of 
cooperation among local, regional and national levels of government may need to be changed 
(Konvitz, 2004, p. 69).”  
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 Plans that clarify the roles and responsibilities for those involved in accomplishing 
specific tasks, provide detailed information to facilitate implementation (U.S. GAO 2009).  IT 
alone cannot address societal decisions such as settlement and land use patterns, construction 
standards and practices, and issues of social justice and equity.However, IT does provide useful 
resources for tackling many of these challenges (Rao et. Al, 2007).  As Kennedy notes, decision-
making processes are not always representative of the community, especially with respect to 
women, youth, and ethnic minorities. He suggests that, “by planning and implementing 
transitional settlement and shelter within the wider context of long-term development, planning, 
and housing activities, then vulnerabilities could be markedly reduced overall, preventing future 
disasters (Kennedy, et al. 2008, p.32).” 
 The large number of nongovernmental organizations involved in disaster operations has 
encouraged the creation of umbrella organizations such as National Volunteer Organizations 
Active in Disaster and Inter-Action (VOAD) (Waugh and Streib, 2006).  Collaborative efforts 
must take place between the organizations involved and the local government to adequately 
serve the people for which they are hired/appointed/elected to help.  Ultimately, “reducing the 
impact of disasters requires a complex mix of technical and social endeavors, and no single 
prescription or discipline can provide all the answers (Rao et. Al 2007, p.34).”  
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III. Research Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 This research consists of a case study of the City of Richmond, evaluating the level of 
collaboration between agencies involved in emergency management.  The study attempts to 
provide insight into the field of emergency management so that other metropolitan areas similar 
to the City of Richmond can utilize any applicable recommendations.  More specifically, the 
study has the following objectives: 
 
1) Illustrate the problem that may currently exist in emergency management regarding 
flooding in Richmond, Virginia and the impact this may have on vulnerable populations.   
 
2) Examine preparedness and response by Federal, State, local agencies, and NGOs in order 
to identify missing links that might prevent hardship in already vulnerable areas.  
a) Identify the role(s) of key governmental and non-governmental agencies in each of 
the four phases of disaster management. 
b) Assess how each agency has evolved its disaster management role over time. 
c) Identify the lead agency during each phase of disaster management and the 
interaction/integration between governmental, non-governmental and private sector 
stakeholders. 
d) Assess the information system capacity and use during each phase of disaster 
management. 
e) Determine how each agency collects, uses, and communicates information with 
affected communities during each phase of a disaster. 
f) Assess what means are currently in place to address the needs of vulnerable 
populations. 
g) Using the perspective of the various agencies determine the current level of 
interagency communication, collaboration and planning for a response during all 
phases of disaster management. 
h) Formulate conclusions about the overall current effectiveness of disaster management 
in the event of major flooding in the City of Richmond.  
 
3) Provide recommendations for future emergency management practices so that minimal 
effects to communities may occur.  
 
 Although the devastation created by catastrophic events is tangible, the means by which 
to proficiently prepare people for such catastrophes while taking into account the vulnerable 
population, as well as being able to restore their lives post-disaster, remains a weak link in 
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emergency management.  The main hypothesis addressed by this thesis is that key governmental 
and private agencies, following prior experience with floods in the Richmond area, have not 
come together to develop a series of plans to address all aspects of disaster mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. Driving this hypothesis is the conclusion emerging from 
the literature reviewed above that agencies involved in emergency preparedness and response at 
various levels should feature clear lines of authority, communication, and responsibility with 
each other in order for their concerted efforts to be effective. Through a predominantly 
qualitative approach based on interviews conducted with key stakeholders in the City of 
Richmond, state agency representatives, as well as prominent NGO personnel, an evaluation of 
existing efforts in the four phases of a disaster can be completed.   
 Based on the literature review, the need for communication, collaboration, data sharing, 
and identification of vulnerable populations is vital throughout all four phases of emergency 
management.  The case of Hurricane Katrina emphasized this need and established the evaluative 
concept for Richmond, VA.   
 The research methodology will first discuss the study area, than describe the research 
strategy implemented to address all objectives, data collection techniques, data analysis 
framework, and finally illustrate the potential limitations that may exist by using such 
methodology.   
Study Area  
 The study area used to conduct this research is the City of Richmond.  Richmond was 
designated as the study area in part because it is a major metropolitan area and is at risk for 50 
year and 100 year floods.  As a planning student, I am particularly interested in disaster recovery 
planning and feel as though the planning profession is not adequately integrated into emergency 
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management. Richmond is roughly 60 square miles located in central Virginia.  As Virginia’s 
state capital, it is not only a viable city, but is located directly along the banks of the James 
River.  The City is an example where emergency management is imperative to not only protect, 
but also sustain the safety of its residents and visitors.  Since the City is geographically located 
along the James, flooding has and will likely once again affect the City/area and the surrounding 
region.  “Floods are the most common natural disaster… (while) 90 percent of all presidential 
declarations of emergency or major disaster involve flooding 
(www.dcr.virginia.gov/dam_safety_and_floodplains/index.shtml).”  Richmond has experienced 
severe flooding, due in part, to hurricanes and tropical depressions over the past decade, but the 
floodwall has saved the city from disastrous James River flooding, but not from surface water 
being trapped behind the floodwall.   
Data Collection 
 Data collection for this study relies on a mixed methods approach consisting of 
qualitative and quantitative techniques. Semi-structured interviews were conducted to obtain 
views from key individuals in emergency management for the City of Richmond. The 
interviewees were selected through a purposive sampling process: respondents consist of 
agencies and individuals responsible for policy, strategy, and decision making in emergency 
management and in a position to provide the information necessary to address the objectives of 
this research (Babbie, 2005).   
 The identification of potential respondents was based primarily on initial Internet 
searches regarding what agencies are typically involved during emergency management. The 
web sites of various agencies were first examined to ensure that their strategic plans and 
mandates covered the topic at hand. Once the agencies were identified, email correspondence 
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was made to personnel indicated as the principal experts in disaster services.  If however, the 
contacted individual did not feel as though he/she was the most suitable candidate to participate 
in this research, the initial correspondence was forwarded to another individual in their office.  
 As a result of this approach 13 individuals ultimately agreed to participate in the 
interview process.  These include local stakeholders and NGOs that provide information and 
assistance before, during, and immediately after a disaster.  One obvious omission is the Army 
Corp of Engineers (USACE), the federal agency responsible for flood control of major 
waterways.  I had difficulty finding an individual within the USACE who was able to address my 
questions regarding Richmond area flooding.  A list of agencies and the type of interviewee is 
provided below.  Since the construction of the Richmond floodwall in 1994, the James River 
flooding of the city has not been an issue for the USACE, as the floodwall gates are the 
responsibility of the City of Richmond Public Works Department. 
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Table 1: Agency and Type of Interviewee 
Agency Abbreviation Type of Interviewee 
Federal Emergency Management 
Agency FEMA (A) 
Disaster Recovery Director, 
Region III 
Virginia Department of 
Emergency Management VDEM (B) 
City of Richmond Emergency 
Manager 
Virginia Department of 
Emergency Management VDEM I 
Acting Director of Operations, 
Emergency Operations 
Center  
Virginia Department of 
Emergency Management VDEM (D) 
Volunteer and Donations 
Coordinator 
Virginia Department of Health VDH (E) 
Director of Emergency 
Preparedness 
Richmond City Health District RCHD (F) District Emergency Planner 
City of Richmond, Fire and 
Emergency Services  FES (G) 
Public Information 
Officer/AFM 
Richmond Ambulance Authority RAA (H) 
Director of Safety and Risk 
Management 
Richmond Regional Planning 
District Commission RRPDC (I) 
Director of Information and 
Planning Systems 
Richmond Regional Planning 
Commission District RRPCD (J) 
Principal Emergency 
Management Planner 
American Red Cross Greater 
Richmond Chapter RC (K) Manager, Disaster Services 
The Salvation Army of Central 
Virginia SA (L) Area Commander 
Virginia Capital Area Regional 
Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disaster VOAD (M) 
State Disaster Relief 
Coordinator 
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 The in-depth interviews were conducted with an instrument containing open-ended 
questions that addressed data collection and sharing, inter-agency activity, agency purpose and 
history, and the extent to which the agency was involved during the aforementioned floods.  The 
in-depth interviews consisted of 20 questions (sections B and C) for which participants were 
encouraged to speak openly and honestly about agency involvement during each phase of a 
disaster preparedness process and to share any concerns or solutions they may have had 
regarding public preparedness and budgetary constraints.  The questionnaires were administered 
in the form of self-administered surveys (section A) or through face-to-face interviews or 
telephone interviews (Section B and C).   The last four questions (section C) were designed to 
probe the historical aspects of the agency, particularly to probe how the agency’s relief activities 
may have been influenced by prior experiences with flooding over the past decade. The initial 
questionnaire was designed with redundancies in the questions, in part as a validation tool, and to 
capture data that may have been missed in a prior question.  There was also some randomness in 
the questions to avoid sequence bias. All interviewees were given a consent form and were asked 
to give permission to have the telephone or face-to-face interview recorded. 
 A Likert-style or summative scale was used for 10 questions that determine the level of 
involvement and/or activity by each agency during the four phases of emergency management.  
Distinguishing the answer choices separately for mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery allows for determination of agency strengths and weaknesses, and the interviewees 
perception of the role of his/her agency.  The scale is based on a 1-5 answer choice where the 
respondent determines the level of activity as no activity, low level of activity, moderately 
active, active or very active respectively. The questions sought to establish agency involvement 
in planning, operations, integration and/or interaction with other government agencies, NGOs, or 
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for-profit agencies, GIS and other software and/or database usage, FEMA’s Response Partner 
Guide usage, and general public communication.  The Likert-style initial questionnaire was 
employed because, “(a scale) takes advantages in differences of intensity among the attributes of 
the same variable to identify distinct patterns of response (Babbie, 2005, p.157)”.   Therefore, the 
mode for a particular question can be determined, resulting in identification of agency 
participation.   
 For the purpose of evaluation, the agencies were subsequently broken into representative 
groups.  In total, 13 individuals were interviewed and administered questionnaires from ten 
separate agencies.  The division included one federal agency, one state agency of which three 
individuals from different departments were interviewed, four local agencies of which two 
individuals from different departments were also interviewed from one agency, and one 
representative from each of three local and/or state departments of a national NGO.  Respondents 
then filled out a 10-question survey identifying what level of activity each agency participates in 
during the four phases of emergency management.  The questions consisted of identifying 
planning and operational activity, interaction with other agencies, means for data collection, use 
of FEMA’s Partnership Guides, and communication with the public.  Of the 13 individuals 
administered the survey, one person from VDEM failed to return the results and therefore is not 
included in the survey evaluation.  In addition, some participants did not respond to specific 
questions for reasons unknown, therefore those results were not included.  
 The data collected from interviews is discussed by means of content analysis.  Recurring 
themes were identified so limitations and recommendations could be made for emergency 
management.  Regarding the survey questions, bar charts were created to illustrate the level of 
activity each agency presents for specific questions.  For triangulation purposes, a content 
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analysis of archived Richmond-Times Dispatch articles was utilized to determine the 
effectiveness, through the media’s representation, of preparedness, response, and recovery from 
the aforementioned three tropical storms.  Based on the experiences of the 2003, 2004, and 2006 
Richmond floods, shortcomings in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery were identified 
and attempts made to determine what has been learned by the responsible agencies to avoid 
similar mistakes in the future.  Questionnaire responses were also compared with agency mission 
statements to identify if and what contradictions may exist between the mission and the actual 
work the agency performs.    
  A descriptive, a table was created to illustrate vulnerability variables for both the 2000 
and 2010 census.  For this study, the variables that were used when determining a vulnerable 
population include: poverty status, female households with children, non-English speakers, 
employment status of household members, number of children in the household, number of 
seniors in household, education status, vehicle accessibility, and the population with disabilities.  
Similarly, a GIS analysis of 2010 census data from the 2006-2010 estimations was performed in 
order to map areas of vulnerability that may be affected by flooding.  The variables mapped 
include: African Americans as the minority group, accessibility to transportation, poverty status, 
persons 17 years and younger, persons 65 years and older, and lastly female household heads.  A 
descriptive, a table was created to illustrate vulnerability variables for both the 2000 and 2010 
census.  Since the data requested in the 2010 census changed from prior decennial data, the 
2006-2010 American Community Survey was used to access the results. A comparison of the 
vulnerability in relation to flood proximity was made if a similar storm occurred today.  The 
critical variables will be based on data that constitutes a vulnerable population.  All data will be 
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evaluated and mapped based on the census tracts where flooding has occurred in recent history 
(2003, 2004 and 2006) within the city. 
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IV. Results 
 
Richmond Floods 
 In order to formalize recommendations for the field of emergency management as it 
relates to urban planning and vulnerability this study focuses on the City of Richmond, Virginia. 
Richmond has experienced devastating floods due in part to such hurricanes and tropical 
depressions as Isabel (2003), Gaston (2004), and more recently Ernesto (2006).  In fact, 
according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Weather Service, 
roughly sixty percent of Virginia river floods begin with flash floods from tropical systems 
passing over. A Major Disaster Declaration was made by FEMA for the City of Richmond as 
well as the surrounding region after both tropical depressions, Gaston and Ernesto. Therefore, 
since the James River passes through the city, Richmond is a good example to assess past 
disaster emergency management successes while identifying areas for improvement during 
future events.   
 The City of Richmond is a relatively small geographical area, roughly 60 square miles 
with an estimated population of approximately 197,790 according to the 2000 census.  Even with 
such a relatively small area and concentrated population, the above mentioned three events that 
passed through the area caused significant financial damage and resulted in loss of life.  Post-
Isabel, Gaston, and definitively Katrina, Richmond officials began to evaluate the procedures in 
place so that they would be better prepared for the next disaster.  Michael Cline, the state 
coordinator at the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM), identified that,’ the 
biggest life-threat is water,’ in Virginia’s natural disasters (Booker, B., June 19, 2006, E-1).  The 
following summary provides an overview of not only the costly, but also life-altering effects that 
Isabel, Gaston, and Ernesto produced for Richmond and its residents.  
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 The first disaster in the area occurred when the remnants of hurricane Isabel hit 
Richmond on September 19, 2003.  Strong wind gusts of upwards 60 mph and rain caused 
extensive damage leaving many without power or water due to downed trees.  The cost to the 
City was estimated at $8.5 million for tree removal and other storm debris, with an estimated 
10,000 trees fallen (Mack, A., www.helium.com).  Roughly, 365,000 homes in the Richmond 
area were left without power for days after the event (Bacque, P. and Hostetler, A.J., September 
19, 2003, p. A-1).   
 On August 30, 2004, flooding prompted by Tropical Storm Gaston devastated the historic 
Shockoe Bottom District, which lies along the James River.  Nearly 15 inches of rain fell within 
ten hours, surpassing any predictions made by the city.  “Much of the water ended up rushing 
into the steep-sided, three-branched valley that snakes between downtown, Church Hill and 
Barton Heights. Where those three branches converge, about a mile-and-a-half north of the 17th 
Street Farmers’ Market, floodwaters were as deep as 8 feet. Frighteningly, that area is a half-mile 
outside the 500-year flood plain (Ress, D., September 5, 2004, p. A-1).”  Some people were even 
trapped in buildings in Shockoe Bottom until rescue workers could reach them.  As a result of 
the torrential downpour resulting in flash flooding, eight people were killed (Robertson, G., 
October 27, 2004, p. H-8).  Additionally, at least 1,000 people were forced from their homes, and 
damages totaled over $20 million.  The resulting flooding prompted Governor Mark Warner to 
declare a state of emergency.  Surprisingly, even the state’s underground Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) was flooded by eight inches of water, forcing emergency personnel to move 
equipment and themselves to higher ground (Bacque, P., August 31, 2004, p. A-1).   
 After Gaston, city officials re-evaluated how to handle an emergency situation for the city 
and its residents.  One step taken to notify the public of an emergency was the creation of a 
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reverse 911-system where residents who have registered with the city receive a call warning 
them of the impending emergency.  Officials also identified 17 low-lying areas that are prone to 
excessive flooding when it was previously thought that only eight areas were susceptible (Nolan, 
J. and Ress, D., August 28, 2005, p. A-10).  Finally, Richmond’s river rescue team exercised 
training in launching boats not only in the James River, but also into Shockoe Bottom after 
rescues were necessary during Gaston (Martz, M., September 11, 2005, p. A-8).  
 The last and more recent catastrophe faced by Richmond, was that of Hurricane Ernesto 
on August 31, 2006. Ernesto moved through Richmond, causing damage particularly to Battery 
Park residents when a sewer line collapsed over an area that had once been a landfill.  Residents 
were inundated with sewage filled water that ultimately resulted in the condemning of 57 
apartments and 21 homes (Martz, M., September 28, 2006, p. A-1).  While the devastation 
approached, but was not as significant as that of Gaston, over 1,000 people still had to be 
evacuated to metro-area shelters.  As a result of the extensive and costly damage, the federal 
government approved more than $41 million to cover the city’s cost of responding to the 
flooding and replacing the damaged sewer line (Ress, D. and Martz, M., September 26, 2006, 
p.A-1).  However, The White House denied a $9 million request from the city, meaning that the 
city was still responsible for about $2 million in clean-up costs.    
 As natural disasters are known to indiscriminately affect the lives of those unfortunate 
enough to be in the path and/or location, socially vulnerable persons suffer more and for an 
extensive period once a disaster strikes.  Although the historical facts for the events that took 
place in Richmond do not account for the socially vulnerable, it is important to note what those 
characteristics are and at the very least identify what that population looks like in Richmond.  
According to the Social Vulnerability Index (SVI), four domains form the basis that makes up 
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the index.  First, socioeconomic variables comprising of individual income, poverty status, 
current employment, and educational attainment.  Second, household composition and disability 
comprising of dependent children less than 18 years of age, persons ages 65 years and older, 
single parent households, and disabled individuals. Third, minority status and English language 
proficiency variables.  Lastly, housing structure condition, overcrowding of housing structure, 
and vehicle accessibility variables (Flanagan, et al. 2011). Table 1, shows the Social 
Vulnerability Index (SVI) variables from the 2000 and 2010 census.  The data provide an 
overview of the vulnerable population that exists in Richmond and identifies the need for who 
should therefore be considered during the phases of emergency management. 
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Table 2: SVI Variables Based on 2000 and 2010 Census Data 
2000 % of population 2010 % of population
Total Population 197790 204214
African American 113108 57.19 103342 50.60
Hispanic or Latino 5074 2.57 12803 6.27
Asian 2471 1.25 4750 2.33
Population 17 
years and under 43178 21.83 38009 18.61
Population 65 
years and over 26129 13.21 22619 11.08
Households with 
individuals under 
18 23459 27.75 21171 25.36
Households with 
Individuals 65 and 
over 19421 22.97 17678 21.17
Female 
householder with 
children under 18 10046 11.88 9323 11.17
Population over 5 
years with 
disability 44227 23.85 X X
Population 25 
years and over 
without high 
school diploma 31907 24.82 25292 19.84
Population 5 years 
and over who 
speak language 
other than English 12503 6.74 18200 9.64
Unemployed 
population 16  
years and over in 
civilian labor force 7943 8.05 11356 6.83
Population without 
vehicle available 18284 9.24 15152 7.42
Individual poverty 
status in 1999 40185 20.32 X X
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 SF1 SF3
Source: U.S. Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community Survey
(X) Indicates the estimate is not available  
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 The above map illustrates the SVI variable of poverty that exists in the City of 
Richmond.  Above 40% constitutes extreme poverty and such areas should be considered when 
addressing the needs of vulnerable populations during a disastrous event in relation to 
impoverished persons.  The map also identifies where flooding occurred during both Hurricane 
Gaston and Ernesto.  Further flooding may occur in areas identified by the 100 year flood plain 
while community centers, healthcare facilities, and schools are mapped as they may be utilized 
for sheltering during an event. 
Map 1: Poverty Distribution in Relation to Flooding 
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 The above map illustrates the SVI variable of race for the African American 
population in Richmond, VA.  The significant flooding that occurred in Battery Park due to 
Ernesto emphasizes the need for vulnerability assessments related to minority populations. 
Additional maps illustrating the SVI variables of age as it pertains to persons 17 years and 
under as well as persons aged 65 years and older, female household heads, and the lack of 
vehicle accessibility can be found in Appendix C.  Concentrations of vulnerable populations 
are located in or near historical flooding  
Map 2: African American Population in Relation to Flooding 
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Research Findings  
 The following research analysis is based on semi-structured interviews with agencies 
representing the federal, state, local, and NGOS that work in emergency management in the City 
of Richmond.  In contrast with the author’s expectations, the findings of this research suggest 
that the public’s general views as to what agency is perceived as being heavily involved in the 
emergency management process, and as to which agency was the leading agency are misguided.  
According to the NRF, “Incidents must be managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional level 
and supported by additional capabilities when needed 
(http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf, p.10).”  In the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, jurisdictional autonomy is apparent in Richmond according to the Code of Virginia 44-
146.18, where ‘each jurisdiction has ownership of its locality’ (B) (http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+44-146.18).  The agencies involved in disaster management take on 
the role of emergency management locally, and if in need of additional assistance they request 
services from the state, which in turn may request federal assistance. The extent of coordination, 
collaboration, and information sharing amongst such agencies is dependent on the type and scale 
of disaster that occurs.  
 According to the NRF, principles, roles, and structures are defined to establish a 
coordinated, effective national response in the event of a disaster and/or emergency (FEMA).  “It 
is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and 
responsibilities across the Nation, linking all levels of government, nongovernmental 
organizations, and the private sector.  It describes how communities, tribes, States, the Federal 
Government, and private-sector and nongovernmental partners apply these principles for a 
coordinated, effective national response…The Framework enables first responders, decision-
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makers, and supporting entities to provide a unified national response 
(http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/about_nrf.pdf).”  All agencies involved in emergency 
management abide by the principles illustrated in the NRF to coordinate efforts in an efficient 
way. The agencies selected represent federal, state, local, and NGOs.   Agency missions and 
interview responses indicate that the agencies’ involvement in operational work or specific 
planning practices ranged dependent upon the agency mission (Appendix D).    The majority of 
agencies represented work both in planning for a disaster and in subsequently reacting to the 
disaster.  The RRPDC is merely a planning agency while the SA and VOAD only have the 
capacity to work operationally once a disaster occurs.  This level of agency involvement among 
the other agencies in both planning and operational activity provides an excellent representation 
for the four phases of emergency management.   
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 However, when analyzing the initial questionnaire results, it was rather unusual to note 
that many agencies did not utilize the FEMA Response Partner Guides that are designed to 
provide a ready reference of key roles and actions.  The figure below illustrates the level of use 
regarding the guide.  Unfortunately, it is unclear why usage is not higher during the response 
phase.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Use of FEMAs Response Partner Guides during Response 
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Agency Hierarchy during Emergency Management 
City of Richmond Mayor 
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Chief Administrative Off icer 
(Deputy Director of Emergency Management)
Coordinator of Emergency Management
American Red Cross
Greater Richmond Chapter
The Salvation Army 
of Central Virginia
VOAD
Virginia Capital Area Region
NGOs
FEMA Region III
Richmond Regional Planning 
District Commission
Richmond City 
Health District
Richmond Ambulance Authority Fire and Emergency Services
Virginia Department of 
Health
Professional Planners
Community Organizations
Heirarchy of Emergency Management
Government
Health 
Local
NGOs
Integrated Suggestion
Virginia Department of 
Emergency Management
 
 
Figure 2: Agency Hierarchy during Emergency Management 
 
 
 The above flow chart identifies the agencies involved and what agencies communicate 
with each other essentially on a regular basis.  The hierarchy was established in part, by the 
legislative order as well as from interviewee response perception.  The role of planners and 
community organizations is suggested to interact with agencies such as the RRPDC and NGOs to 
further foster capacity building for the local level.  In this regard, information can be easily 
shared closely with the local emergency manager.   
 
Legend 
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Agency Interaction and Methods used for Interagency Information Sharing 
 Regarding agency interaction and integration to promote coordination and collaboration, 
all agencies stressed the importance of working together.  Locally, mutual-aid agreements are in 
place so that one jurisdiction can provide resources, facilities, services, personnel, and other 
support to another jurisdiction (Gallant, 2008).  The federal and state agencies display these 
principles by coordinating plans and strategies of hazard assessment, resource mobilization, and 
operations with other entities (Col, 2007).  FEMA stated that the enabling legislation requires 
them to take on a coordination role. “Another key aspect of the legislation is that we supplement 
the efforts of local and state governments… when it gets so overwhelming, like say as it did in 
Hurricane Isabel, then the Governor and VDEM state coordinator would make the decision to 
call us in and ask us for assistance (FEMA).”  Locally, the RCHD works with the Medical 
Reserve Corps, which is part of Citizen Corps Council and the RAA.  Regarding NGOs, VDEMs 
volunteer and donations department works closely with VOAD, Community Emergency 
Response Teams (CERT), and ‘to some degree the business community is a partner (D).’ 
 Methods for promoting information sharing to build collaboration within the city include 
disaster preparedness committee meetings held monthly between representatives from all city 
departments. Parties involved include Richmond’s emergency manager, local NGOs, local 
colleges and universities, and state representation from VDEM and VDH.  The RCHD leads 
quarterly meetings involving hospitals, community clinics, the Red Cross, and the Department of 
Social Services (DSS), utilizing NIMS and Incident Command System (ICS). At the federal 
level, meetings are conducted twice annually, at a minimum, by the Regional Interagency 
Steering Committee (RISC).  The committee is comprised of various other federal agencies in 
region III and also state representatives.  Regarding NGOS, VOAD members meet three times 
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per year.  Besides meetings, conference calls, email, and webinars were cited as an economical 
way of maintaining relationships between agencies.   
 In the event of an actual disaster, communication is increased at the state level through 
situation reports provided daily via WebEOC, a crisis information management system that 
provides secure, real-time information sharing.  The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is 
centrally located in the RAA, providing a quick response time for emergency medical services.  
Once activated the EOC hosts an array of agency representatives including, but not limited to 
public works and utilities, public health, law enforcement, EMS, emergency management, and 
the mayor’s office so that an emergency plan can be devised quickly.  Conference calls and 
situation reports are then conducted and distributed so that information can be available and up-
to-date.  Similarly, the Virginia Interoperability Picture for Emergency Response (VIPER) 
allows the Virginia Emergency Operations Center to display information that relates to each 
other spatially in order to drastically improve the situational awareness of response, recovery 
coordinators, and local emergency managers (https://cop.vdem.virginia.gov/viper).  However, 
this software is for registered users only in the emergency management profession.  FESs data 
collection is used to evaluate assistance: ‘when fire and police are on the street along with Public 
Utilities and Works, they report back their findings and we collect and share that information to 
develop a plan (FES).” 
 At the federal level, once an operation is in effect, ‘we establish an operation center 
working command post through the joint federal and state field office process… located 
somewhere in or near the impacted area (FEMA).’  Parties involved include VDEM: ‘We may 
have other commonwealth agencies in there, maybe the small business administration, The Army 
Corps of Engineers (FEMA).’  FEMA also provides a platform for registered users to 
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communicate about lessons learned from past disasters through the Lessons Learned Information 
Sharing (LLIS) website.    
 Regarding NGOs, the Coordinated Network Assistance (CAN) is a partnership that works 
with national, regional, and local relief organizations.  “CAN provides assistance to nonprofits in 
developing, enhancing, and maintaining technological competency in the administration and 
delivery of services in order to maximize effectiveness and leverage resources.  CAN harnesses 
the power of the Internet through a centralized database, resulting in shared, secure, up-to-date 
information about disaster victims and their needs and the timely delivery of services without 
duplication of efforts (http://www.can.org/our-mission/about-can).”  Also, volunteers do an 
assessment on the ground and call central locations back to determine the need for help.  VOAD 
is useful because, ‘you may run into redundancy when providing assistance if the information is 
not shared (VOAD).’ 
 Other tools used by the agencies during an emergency include GIS. FEMA states, ‘we 
use GIS in damage assessment, but also in conducting actual disaster operations (FEMA).’  The 
RCHD utilizes GIS in their mass operations dispensing plan because of a mandate with the CDC.  
“GIS is used to map out population concentrations, where pods need to be, in part because of 
transportation needs… For epidemiology measures (which is the agency’s ‘bread and butter’) 
GIS is used quite a bit (RCHD).”  According to VDEM, only a handful of voluntary 
organizations do have GIS capabilities for tracking their assets, response units, and similar 
resources (D).  For example, some mass feeding units with national volunteer organizations do 
have GIS tracking devices so that equipment location can easily be identified and deployed 
elsewhere if necessary.  On the other hand, VOAD itself does not use GIS because the 
organization discovered that Google maps earth was sufficient to meet their needs. 
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 An unexpected result regarding the use of GIS by the RAA was that it was not readily 
used during any of the four phases of emergency management, particularly response.  However, 
the agency is known globally for the sophisticated system they employ.  The following figure 
illustrates the use of GIS for all agencies, most notably the RAA. 
Figure 3: Use of GIS during Response 
   
Tools for Communicating with the Public 
 Tools currently in place to inform not only emergency managers, but also business 
associations regarding the status of an event include the EOC’s joint information center that 
produces a daily document called the Virginia briefing report.  The report goes directly to an 
estimated 2,500 people who, in turn, forward the information others in their field to the public? 
Once the EOC is activated, the public can view the situation reports online.  Informing the public 
regarding the aid available after an event are somewhat heavily web based.  As noted, “the 
external affairs element is a very standing and significant part of any disaster operation 
(FEMA).”  However, FEMA’s accessibility to information regarding assistance is available 
online, by telephone, or in-person at a Disaster Recovery Center (DRC).  FEMA has a very 
comprehensive external affairs group that provides press releases, conducts media interviews, 
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and performs other forms of outreach work. Additionally, FEMA may conduct town meetings 
for specific populations and, “are getting more and more involved in social media now, 
recognizing that a lot of people get their information from sources like Facebook and Twitter 
(FEMA).”  An Information and Referral system, such as Virginia 2-1-1 is also available for 
victims to call and be connected to an agency or organization with the capability of fulfilling 
their needs.  The free phone assistance is a service of the Virginia Department of Social Services 
in collaboration with United Way, among other organizations.   However, according to VDEM a 
substantial portion of the population is not familiar with 2-1-1 unless they have some connection 
to social services.  VDEM (D) believes that television and radio seem to be the best means for 
getting information out.  Similarly, the RCHD communicates to the public through their website, 
radio, television, in-house clinics and are, “one of the very few districts with a full time public 
information officer (RCHD).” Do they use any text message system? 
 Considering that an event may damage property, public utilities, and other types of 
infrastructure, victims may experience a lack of phone service or transportation to a DRC or 
NGO facility.  Unfortunately, vulnerable populations may also not have access to or knowledge 
about the use of computers.  Most significantly, many of the agencies spoke of the public’s 
complacency regarding preparedness and their expectations post-disaster.  Individuals are 
encouraged to prepare themselves for at least a 72 hour period without any formal assistance.  
One site in place to raise public awareness is Ready Virginia, but it seems unlikely that people 
visit VDEMs website specifically for preparedness tips.  
Addressing Social Vulnerability 
 As natural disasters are known to indiscriminately affect the lives of those unfortunate 
enough to be in the path and/or location, socially vulnerable persons suffer more and for an 
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extensive period once a disaster strikes.  Although the historical facts for the events that took 
place in Richmond do not account for the socially vulnerable, it is important to note what those 
characteristics are and at the very least identify what that population looks like in Richmond.  
 Identifying who are vulnerable and where they reside is a challenging task for emergency 
managers.  When asked, VDEM stated that a regional registry of special needs individuals was in 
working order until funding for the project was lost.  The local emergency manager was working 
with the RRPCD, RCHD, and the RAA to establish such a document identifying those in need.  
The project was to be funded by a federal grant from the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), 
but the grant was ultimately lost.  The RCHD said the region has tried for several years, 
beginning in roughly 2004, to create a document where people could report their special needs 
and register with the locality.  The need to identify vulnerable populations in case of a disaster 
was not necessarily to identify what an individual’s condition is, but that they exist in case of 
functional needs sheltering.  Besides funding, additional problems included legal issues and 
technology issues.  The privacy of patient and social services information is protected by The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 
 Federally, FEMA does have disability coordinators in each of the 10 regional offices.  It 
is a full-time job to address the need of vulnerable people and any other special population that 
comes to their attention.  “We recognize for example, that in urban areas we have a lot of people 
that don’t own automobiles. So we know that in servicing that population in things like an 
evacuation, we may have to bring in buses or some other form of transportation. We can work 
through the state and local (agencies) in identifying the special needs and then we revise our 
operation accordingly to address those needs (FEMA).”  However, if the localities are not even 
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able to identify that portion of the population, how do they expect to share that information that 
simply does not exist?   
 NGOs face a similar problem, but may be able to more readily gather such information 
because of the individuals they already serve.  VDEMs planning department reaches out to 
voluntary organizations to help them gather the information about where vulnerable populations 
are so that a general idea exists (D). For example when the planning department is trying to 
identify where pockets of senior adults are, they can reach out to the council of aging or the Red 
Cross.  However VOAD stated that not a lot is being done and honestly (he) doesn’t know what 
can be done other than education (phone list). “People rely on the government rather than taking 
personal responsibility (VOAD).”  Currently, there seems little hope of gathering and 
documenting where vulnerability exists, not only due to funding constraints and privacy 
mandates, but because it is a continuous process trying to identify the variables and maintain 
specific statistics. 
Problems Faced in Emergency Management 
 A significant problem that was identified by nearly all agencies was current or pending 
budget cuts.  At the local level, the department of emergency management for the RRPDC has 
only secured funding through 2013.  The representative from that agency is unsure if the small 
department of three personnel will exist beyond that year.  The RCHD, which is funded by the 
CDC, is facing a 7% cut for the fiscal year along with reductions over the past several years.  
Citing that, “public health has a role in any disaster (RCHD),” the importance of trained 
professionals to assist during an event is vital.  Unfortunately, the Medical Reserve Corps 
(MRC), a volunteer based organization working with the RCHD and funded by the Metropolitan 
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Medical Response System (MMRS), “has seen dramatic cuts in the last couple of years with 
more cuts projected for the next year (RCHD).” 
 At the state level, the VDH reported a 15% decrease in federal grants although the agency 
is funded by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in addition to federal grants.  Not only are 
federally funded agencies experiencing budget cuts, but NGOs have seen a significant decrease 
in donations that help to cover administrative costs.  The Salvation Army of Central Virginia 
eliminated the Emergency Services Director (ESD) last October.  The ESD was responsible for 
building and maintaining relationships with other agency emergency managers.  Therefore, the 
SA’s ability to plan and prepare for disasters has been hampered.  Other NGOs that are primarily 
run through public donations have experienced significant decreases since the economic 
recession as well.  “Any event that has occurred since 2005, has not received nearly the 
donations that were received, say from, Hurricane Andrew through Hurricane Katrina (D).”   
 Budget constraints not only affected localities and state governments, but federal 
agencies have had similar setbacks.   “We certainly have, of particularly over the last year and 
the outlook going into the next several years is not very good.  We, in fact expect to take more 
budget cuts, as most federal agencies are, so that is something that we are struggling with at this 
time (FEMA).”  FEMA has two major funding sources, a regular funding source like most 
federal agencies that establishes the typical operating budget for any given fiscal year and then 
for actual disaster operations there is the President’s disaster relief fund. That separate funding 
source typically is fed on an as needed basis.  Referencing the numerous disaster declarations of 
2011, FEMA stated that, “if we have a year like we are having this year… we end up spending a 
lot money in assistance then Congress has the opportunity to supplement that fund (FEMA).” 
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V. Conclusions 
Recommendations 
 As urban areas increase in density, the risk for extensive property damage and potential 
loss of life intensifies during a natural disaster.  How agencies ultimately prepare the public for 
an event and how they subsequently handle the response and recovery is vital.  Through 
communication, collaborative networks can be developed to pool resources that may otherwise 
be scarce.  Federal, State, local and nongovernmental organizations are responsible for the four 
phases of emergency management as doctrine by the NRF.   
 The research conducted sought to answer the three following objectives. 
 
1) Illustrate the problem that may currently exist in emergency management following 
flooding in Richmond, Virginia and the impact this may have on vulnerable populations.   
 
2) Examine preparedness and response by Federal, State, local agencies, and NGOs in order 
to identify missing links that might prevent hardship in already vulnerable areas.  
 
3) Provide recommendations for future emergency management practices so that minimal 
effects to communities may occur.  
 
 Upon data analysis of the interviewee responses representing 10 agencies, it was found 
that communication and collaboration are encouraged.  However, since the agencies work at 
different levels of government the hierarchy determined who was ultimately in charge. 
The results of this study suggest that communication and collaboration exists between all 
agencies, but the extent to which well devised plans in emergency management are successful is 
undeterminable until the next catastrophe.  Although budget constraints exist, the agencies work 
together to pool resources and build capacity.  One of the most significant findings was the lack 
of documentation representing vulnerable populations who are typically in the most need of 
assistance post disaster.    
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 The role of planners should be considered and developed so that professional knowledge 
of existing vulnerable populations can be shared with appropriate agencies.  Since planning 
heavily involves the public, local planners should work alongside key community organizations 
to foster lines of communication between local governments and NGOs.  The need for public 
involvement in emergency management has yet to be encouraged.  Public complacency will only 
compound an already futile effort.  Therefore,   fostering a relationship with community 
networks will only help to create a more sustainably resilient community after any disaster. 
 
Limitations and Potential Problems 
 
 For most communities, emergency management is similarly constructed and/or handled 
similarly.  Suggestions made can be applicable not only to localities, but regionally as well.  The 
research suggests that emergencies are considered local events, and therefore, should be handled 
locally with state and/or federal guidance and assistance when needed.  Strengthening the lines 
of communication between the local, state, and federal government will foster relationships that 
produce resourceful community members in the event of an emergency. 
 By conducting in-person interviews, it was observed that the respondents were willing to 
provide more information than initially requested.  However, it is unclear if respondents were 
answering the questions in a manner that was politically expedient.  Therefore, possible 
responses could have intentionally been undisclosed.  Although additional responses were 
insightful, a couple of interviewees did not specifically answer the questions asked.  In 
comparison, however, it was apparent that the phone interviews did not support probing for 
further responses.  The phone interviews conducted seemed impersonal and did not produce the 
breadth of data obtained by the face-to-face interviews.  Regarding survey results, missing data is 
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also a consideration.  Only two respondents did not fully complete the initial questionnaire for 
reasons unknown.  Missing data does present a problem in index construction.  Handling the 
missing data is resolved by treating it as one of the available responses (Babbie, 2005).  For 
instance, the missing data will be considered as a ‘not active’ response.  Although this solution 
will possibly alter the data analysis results, the effects are minuscule.  
 One potential shortcoming of the technique used in the current study is that it relies on 
self-reporting by the involved parties and the data gathered are not subject to independent 
verification.  Thus, while this type of study may evaluate the inter-organizational structure of the 
planning process and response to a natural disaster it does not allow one to determine their 
overall effectiveness in a real-life situation.  There are many examples of disaster plans that seem 
good on paper but which are found to have numerous problems when subjected to a test scenario 
or to the real event.   Additionally, the questions asked might have been different had the 
interviewees been involved in their development.  This potential issue was addressed by allowing 
the interviewees to respond to rather open-ended questions (Appendix A) 
 A major perturbation was encountered during the interviews that must impact the 
implementation of any planning, and in some cases impact the planning process itself.  Virtually 
all agency interviews, with the possible exception of FEMA, reported draconian budget cuts that 
had either taken place or were about to take place.  These will undoubtedly affect the outcome of 
any disaster planning. 
 Future studies that may enhance the research currently available regarding emergency 
management successes and shortfalls, may include working with local community organizations 
to evaluate the level of preparedness and the resiliency during recovery.  Particularly, looking 
back at events such as Hurricane Katrina or disasters that occurred on a much smaller scale will 
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provide insight as to change needed.  Lessons learned will be applicable to an extent if a much 
more severe disaster were to occur.  Unfortunately, only time will tell what needs to be in place 
in order to lessen the effects of the next major natural disaster.   
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Appendix A 
Interview Questions 
Release Authorization 
 
I hereby give consent for release of the following information obtained from the questionnaire 
administered and the interview conducted by Jocelyn Leitch.  
 
All information obtained is strictly for Virginia Commonwealth University student research 
purposes in partial fulfillment for a Master’s in Urban and Regional Planning. 
 
 
Signature ________________________________  
 
Date ______________     
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Date________     Agency _______________________   
       
The purpose of the following questionnaire and interview is specifically for student research regarding 
the extent to which data sharing is conducted between government agencies and non-governmental 
organizations in the metropolitan area of the City of Richmond before, during, and immediately after 
a major natural disaster. 
Questionnaire and interview format  
-Cluster question types. 
-Randomize question types to prevent order bias. 
-Use of Likert-type scale where appropriate (1-5). 
-Some redundancy employed for validation purposes and to capture missed information using different 
formats. 
 
Initial Questionnaire: 
Agency:                                                                         
   Address: 
   Website: 
 
Type of agency: Federal. State, Local, NGO 
 
Representative (interviewee)  
   Name:                                                         
   Title: 
 
A. For the following questions, use the scale (1-5) to rate the level of involvement/activity of your 
agency: (1) No Activity  (2) Low Level of Activity  (3) Moderately Active  (4) Active  (5) Very Active 
1. Planning activity of your agency for each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. _______ 
b. Preparedness. _______ 
c. Response. _______ 
d. Recovery. _______ 
 
2. Operational work of your agency within the community during each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. ______ 
b. Preparedness. ______ 
c. Response. ______ 
d. Recovery. ______ 
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3. Integration/interaction with (other) governmental agencies during each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. _____ 
b. Preparedness. _____ 
c. Response. _____ 
d. Recovery, _____ 
 
4. Integration/interaction with NGOs during each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. ____ 
b. Preparedness. ____  
c. Response. _____ 
d. Recovery. _____ 
 
5. Integration/interaction with the for-profit sector (e.g. Chamber of Commerce, insurance 
industry) during each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. ____ 
b. Preparedness. ____ 
c. Response. ____ 
d. Recovery. ____  
 
6. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) capacity of your agency. _____ 
 
7. Use of GIS in the planning activity of your agency for each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. _____ 
b. Preparedness. _____ 
c. Response. _____ 
d. Recovery. _____ 
 
8. Use of other databases in the planning activity of your agency for each of the following phases. 
(Please indicate database resources used) 
a. Mitigation. ____ 
b. Preparedness. _____ 
c. Response. _____ 
d. Recovery. _____ 
  Database(s) used: __________________________________________ 
9. Utilization of FEMA’s Response Partner Guide during each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. ____ 
b. Preparedness. ____ 
c. Response. ____ 
d. Recovery. ____ 
      
10. Communication with the general public during each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. ____ 
b. Preparedness. ____ 
c. Response. ____ 
d. Recovery. ____ 
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       Agency _______________________ 
B. Initial Interview Questions  
1. Is your agency involved merely in planning, or does your agency work operationally within the 
community?   
2.  Is this agency a government entity, an NGO, or a private for-profit organization?  
3. What tools beyond website links are currently in place to provide information regarding the 
availability of assistance to those affected by a disaster? 
4. What steps are being taken to promote data sharing in the event of a disaster and with what other 
agencies is your agency communicating? 
5. Is such interagency data sharing during the four phases of emergency management continuous or 
intermittent?  If intermittent please provide information on the triggers for, and frequency of such 
communication.  
 
6. What discrete efforts have been made since the last disaster to improve services if such a disaster 
were to occur again? 
7. From your perspective, what lines of communication exist between the City of Richmond and the 
various emergency management services? 
8. What data collection methods and tools are used to evaluate the need for and provide assistance to 
affected populations during a disaster? 
9. Do these collection methods include Geographic Information Systems (GIS)? 
10. How does the agency relay pertinent information and with whom does it share such information? 
11. What, if any, provisions are made for identifying the short and long-term needs of vulnerable 
populations? 
12. What is the availability of information, given out by your agency, regarding the status of disaster 
response to the general public? 
13. What means of communication are used to promote public awareness during the four phases of 
emergency management (public media, reverse 911, social media, 211 Virginia- a phone number 
connecting people with free information on available community services, etc.)? 
14. During which phase of emergency management does your agency figure most prominently?  
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15. Which agency do you consider the lead agency during each phase of emergency management? 
  
16. With what agencies, if any, do you share disaster-related meeting minutes and reports? 
      Agency _______________________ 
C. Historical Questions 
1. When was your agency originally founded, and what was the primary purpose or mission at that 
time? 
 
2. How has your agency evolved from its original purpose to the mission and services it now provides? 
 
 
3. Was your agency involved during the flooding associated with the hurricanes and tropical 
depressions Isabel (2003), Gaston (2004), and more recently Ernesto (2006)? 
 
4. Are disaster related services the primary function of your agency? 
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Appendix B 
Questionnaire Raw Data 
Table 3: Planning Activity during Emergency Management  
Question 1 Planning Activity Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
FEMA
RecoveryDirector 
Region III 5 5 5 5
VDEM Emergency Manager 3 5 5 4
VDEM Operations Director 5 5 5 5
VDH Preparedness Director 5 5 5 5
RCHD Emergency Planner 4 5 5 4
EFS
Public Information 
Officer 4 5 5 5
RAA
Director of Safety and 
Risk Management 3 2 1 1
RRPCD
Director of Information 
and Planning Systems 5 5 1 2
RRPCD
Emergency 
Management Planner 4 5 3 3
RC
Manager, Disaster 
Services 3 5 4 4
SA Area Commander 3 4 5 4
VOAD
State Disaster Relief 
Coordinator 3 5 5 5  
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Table 4: Operational Activity during Emergency Management 
Question 2 Operational Activity Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
FEMA
RecoveryDirector 
Region III 5 5 5 5
VDEM Emergency Manager 2 5 5 2
VDEM Operations Director 5 5 5 5
VDH Preparedness Director 5 5 5 5
RCHD Emergency Planner 3 5 5 3
EFS
Public Information 
Officer 5 5 5 5
RAA
Director of Safety and 
Risk Management 3 2 1 1
RRPCD
Director of Information 
and Planning Systems 1 1 1 1
RRPCD
Emergency 
Management Planner 1 1 1 1
RC
Manager, Disaster 
Services 3 5 5 5
SA Area Commander 3 4 5 5
VOAD
State Disaster Relief 
Coordinator 3 4 5 5  
Table 5: Interaction with Government Agencies during Emergency Management 
Question 3 Interaction w/govt Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
FEMA
Recovery Director 
Region III 4 5 5 5
VDEM Emergency Manager 3 5 5 4
VDEM Operations Director 5 5 5 5
VDH Preparedness Director 5 5 5 5
RCHD Emergency Planner 5 5 5 5
EFS
Public Information 
Officer 5 5 5 5
RAA
Director of Safety and 
Risk Management 3 2 1 1
RRPCD
Director of Information 
and Planning Systems 5 5 1 2
RRPCD
Emergency 
Management Planner 5 5 1 2
RC
Manager, Disaster 
Services 3 4 5 5
SA Area Commander 3 5 5 5
VOAD
State Disaster Relief 
Coordinator 3 5 5 5  
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Table 6: Interaction with NGOS during Emergency Management 
Question 4 Interaction w/NGOs Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
FEMA
Recovery Director 
Region III 2 4 3 5
VDEM Emergency Manager 2 2 3 2
VDEM Operations Director 4 5 5 4
VDH Preparedness Director 4 4 4 4
RCHD Emergency Planner 5 5 5 5
EFS
Public Information 
Officer 5 5 5 5
RAA
Director of Safety and 
Risk Management 4 4 1 1
RRPCD
Director of Information 
and Planning Systems 4 4 1 1
RRPCD
Emergency 
Management Planner 3 4 1 2
RC
Manager, Disaster 
Services 2 4 4 4
SA Area Commander 4 5 5 5
VOAD
State Disaster Relief 
Coordinator 3 5 5 5  
Table 7: Interaction with Private Sector during Emergency Management 
Question 5 Interaction w/Private Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
FEMA
Recovery Director 
Region III 3 3 2 3
VDEM Emergency Manager
VDEM Operations Director 3 4 4 4
VDH Preparedness Director 4 4 4 4
RCHD Emergency Planner 4 4 4 4
EFS
Public Information 
Officer 4 5 5 4
RAA
Director of Safety and 
Risk Management 4 4 4 4
RRPCD
Director of Information 
and Planning Systems 2 2 1 1
RRPCD
Emergency 
Management Planner 2 2 1 2
RC
Manager, Disaster 
Services 1 4 3 3
SA Area Commander 2 2 4 4
VOAD
State Disaster Relief 
Coordinator 2 4 4 4  
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Table 8: GIS Capacity during Emergency Management 
Question 6 GIS Capacity
FEMA
Recovery Director 
Region III 4
VDEM Emergency Manager
VDEM Operations Director
VDH Preparedness Director 4
RCHD Emergency Planner 5
EFS
Public Information 
Officer 5
RAA
Director of Safety and 
Risk Management 1
RRPCD
Director of Information 
and Planning Systems 5
RRPCD
Emergency 
Management Planner 5
RC
Manager, Disaster 
Services
SA Area Commander 3
VOAD
State Disaster Relief 
Coordinator 2  
Table 9: Use of GIS during Emergency Management 
Question 7 Use of GIS in Planning Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
FEMA
Recovery Director 
Region III 3 1 4 4
VDEM Emergency Manager
VDEM Operations Director 5 5 5 5
VDH Preparedness Director 4 4 5 4
RCHD Emergency Planner 5 5 5 5
EFS
Public Information 
Officer 5 5 5 5
RAA
Director of Safety and 
Risk Management 1 1 1 1
RRPCD
Director of Information 
and Planning Systems 5 5 4 2
RRPCD
Emergency 
Management Planner 5 4 1 3
RC
Manager, Disaster 
Services 1 4 4 2
SA Area Commander 2 2 4 4
VOAD
State Disaster Relief 
Coordinator 1 1 2 2  
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Table 10: Use of other Databases during Emergency Management 
Question 8 Use of other databases Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
FEMA
Recovery Director 
Region III 5 4 5 5
VDEM Emergency Manager
VDEM Operations Director
VDH Preparedness Director 5 5 4 4
RCHD Emergency Planner 5 5 4 3
EFS
Public Information 
Officer 5 5 5 5
RAA
Director of Safety and 
Risk Management 2 2 1 1
RRPCD
Director of Information 
and Planning Systems 5 5 5 1
RRPCD
Emergency 
Management Planner
RC
Manager, Disaster 
Services
SA Area Commander 2 4 5 5
VOAD
State Disaster Relief 
Coordinator 2 3 3 3  
 
Table 11: Use of FEMA Partner Guide during Emergency Management 
Question 9 FEMA Partner Guide Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
FEMA
Recovery Director 
Region III 2 4 3 3
VDEM Emergency Manager 1 1 1 1
VDEM Operations Director 5 5 3 4
VDH Preparedness Director 3 3 3 3
RCHD Emergency Planner 4 4 4 4
EFS
Public Information 
Officer 4 4 4 4
RAA
Director of Safety and 
Risk Management
RRPCD
Director of Information 
and Planning Systems 4 4 4 1
RRPCD
Emergency 
Management Planner 4 4 1 2
RC
Manager, Disaster 
Services 1 3 5 4
SA Area Commander 4 5 5 5
VOAD
State Disaster Relief 
Coordinator 1 2 3 3  
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Table 12: Communication with Public during Emergency Management 
Question 10 Communication Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
FEMA
Recovery Director 
Region III 4 3 3 5
VDEM Emergency Manager
VDEM Operations Director 4 5 5 5
VDH Preparedness Director 5 5 5 5
RCHD Emergency Planner 5 5 5 5
EFS
Public Information 
Officer 5 5 5 5
RAA
Director of Safety and 
Risk Management 2 3 1 1
RRPCD
Director of Information 
and Planning Systems 5 5 1 1
RRPCD
Emergency 
Management Planner 1 1 1 1
RC
Manager, Disaster 
Services 1 5 5 4
SA Area Commander 3 4 4 4
VOAD
State Disaster Relief 
Coordinator 2 2 3 3  
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Appendix C 
The following maps illustrate SVI variables in relation to historical flooding and the location of 
facilities such as community centers, healthcare facilities, and schools that may be used as 
shelters in the event of a disaster declaration. 
 
Map 3: Population Age 17 and Under in Relation to Flooding 
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Map 4: Population Age 65 and Over in Relation to Flooding 
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Map 5: Population of Female Household Heads in Relation to Flooding 
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Map 6: Population without a Vehicle Accessible in Relation to Flooding 
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The following figures represent a graphical representation of the initial survey questionnaire  
 
A. For the following questions, use the scale (1-5) to rate the level of involvement/activity of 
your agency: (1) No Activity (2) Low Level of Activity (3) Moderately Active  (4) Active  (5) 
Very Active 
 
1. Planning activity of your agency for each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. _______ 
b. Preparedness. _______ 
c. Response. _______ 
d. Recovery. _______ 
 
         Figure 4: Planning Activity of Agency during Mitigation 
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        Figure 5: Planning Activity of Agency during Preparedness 
  
        Figure 6: Planning Activity of Agency during Response 
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        Figure 7: Planning Activity of Agency during Recovery 
 
 
 
2. Operational work of your agency within the community during each of the following 
phases. 
a. Mitigation. ______ 
b. Preparedness. ______ 
c. Response. ______ 
d. Recovery. ______ 
 
       Figure 8: Operational Activity of Agency during Mitigation 
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       Figure 9: Planning Activity of Agency during Preparedness 
 
 
       Figure 10: Planning Activity of Agency during Response 
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       Figure 11: Planning Activity of Agency during Recovery 
 
 
 
3. Integration/interaction with (other) governmental agencies during each of the following 
phases. 
a. Mitigation. _____ 
b. Preparedness. _____ 
c. Response. _____ 
d.    Recovery, _____ 
 
 
        Figure 12: Integration/Interaction with (other) Governmental Agencies during Mitigation 
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        Figure 13: Integration/Interaction with (other) Governmental Agencies during Preparedness 
 
 
 
        Figure 14: Integration/Interaction with (other) Governmental Agencies during Response 
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        Figure 15: Integration/Interaction with (other) Governmental Agencies during Recovery 
 
 
4. Integration/interaction with NGOs during each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. ____ 
b. Preparedness. ____  
c. Response. _____ 
d. Recovery. _____ 
 
 
        Figure 16: Agency Integration/Interaction with NGOs during Mitigation 
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        Figure 17: Agency Integration/Interaction with NGOs during Preparedness 
 
 
 
 
        Figure 18: Agency Integration/Interaction with NGOs during Response 
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        Figure 19: Agency Integration/Interaction with NGOs during Recovery 
 
 
 
5. Integration/interaction with the for-profit sector (e.g. Chamber of Commerce, insurance 
industry) during each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. ____ 
b. Preparedness. ____ 
c. Response. ____ 
d. Recovery. ____ 
 
 
       Figure 20: Integration/interaction with the for-profit sector during Mitigation 
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       Figure 21: Integration/interaction with the for-profit sector during Preparedness 
 
 
 
       Figure 22: Integration/interaction with the for-profit sector during Response 
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       Figure 23: Integration/interaction with the for-profit sector during Recovery 
 
 
 
6. Use of GIS in the planning activity of your agency for each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. _____ 
b. Preparedness. _____ 
c. Response. _____ 
d. Recovery. _____ 
 
 
        Figure 24: Use of GIS in the Planning Activity during Mitigation 
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        Figure 25: Use of GIS in the Planning Activity during Preparedness 
 
 
 
        Figure 26: Use of GIS in the Planning Activity during Recovery 
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7. Utilization of FEMA’s Response Partner Guide during each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. ____ 
b. Preparedness. ____ 
c. Response. ____ 
d. Recovery. ____ 
 
 
       Figure 27: Use of FEMA Partner Guide during Mitigation 
 
 
 
 
       Figure 28: Use of FEMA Partner Guide during Preparedness 
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       Figure 29: Use of FEMA Partner Guide during Recovery 
 
 
      
8. Communication with the general public during each of the following phases. 
a. Mitigation. ____ 
b. Preparedness. ____ 
c. Response. ____ 
d. Recovery. ____ 
 
 
      Figure 30: Communication with Public during Mitigation 
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       Figure 31: Communication with Public during Preparedness 
 
 
 
       Figure 32: Communication with Public during Response 
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       Figure 33: Communication with Public during Recovery 
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Appendix D 
Acronyms 
CDC  Centers for Disease Control 
CVUASI Central Virginia Urban Areas Security Initiative 
CART  Citizens Advisory Recovery Team 
CRFES City of Richmond Fire and Emergency Services 
CERT  Community Emergency Response Team 
COOP  Continuity of Operations 
CAN  Coordinated Network Assistance 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DRC  Disaster Recovery Center 
EMMA Emergency Management Mapping Application 
EOC  Emergency Operation Center 
ESF  Emergency Support Function 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
GIS  Geographic Information Systems 
LLIS  Lessons Learned Information Sharing 
MRC  Medical Reserve Corps 
MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response System 
NIMS  National Incident Management System 
NRF  National Response Framework 
RISC  Regional Interagency Steering Committee 
RAA   Richmond Ambulance Authority 
RAA   Richmond Ambulance Authority 
RCHD  Richmond City Health District 
REPC  Richmond Emergency Planning Committee 
RRPDC Richmond Regional Planning District Commission 
SA  Salvation Army 
SVI  Social Vulnerability Index 
SHELDUS Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States 
UASI   Urban Area Security Initiative 
VDEM Virginia Department of Emergency Management 
VDH  Virginia Department of Health 
VIPER  Virginia Interoperability Picture for Emergency Response 
VOAD  Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster  
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Agency Mission Statements 
 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA Region III) 
 (Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia and W. Virginia) “FEMA’s 
mission is to support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation we work together 
to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover 
from, and mitigate all hazards (http://www.fema.gov/about/index.shtm#0, accessed 3/21/11).” 
 
Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) 
“The Virginia Department of Emergency Management works with local government, state and 
federal agencies and voluntary organizations to provide resources and expertise through the four 
phases of emergency management (http://www.vaemergency.com/aboutus/what-we-do, accessed 
3/21/11).” 
 
Virginia Department of Health (VDH), Emergency Preparedness Program 
“Our mission is to effectively respond to any emergency impacting public health through 
preparation, collaboration, education and rapid intervention. VDH Emergency Preparedness 
involves state, regional and local emergency response partners working together to enhance 
readiness to respond to all hazards, including bioterrorism, infectious disease outbreaks and other 
public health emergencies (http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/oep/, accessed 4/14/11).” 
 
Richmond City Health District (RCHD), Emergency Preparedness Program 
“The RCHD Emergency Preparedness Program develops plans and coordinates activities to 
ensure that the Richmond City Health District is prepared to respond rapidly and effectively to 
public health emergencies. Our emergency preparedness coordinator works closely with city, 
state, and federal emergency planners to plan and implement responses to threats such as disease 
outbreaks or natural disasters (http://www.vdh.state.va.us/LHD/richmondcity/programs.htm, 
accessed 4/14/11).” 
 
City of Richmond Fire and Emergency Services 
The Office of Emergency Management 
“The Office of Emergency Management's mission is to plan, prepare for and mitigate 
emergencies; educate the public on preparedness; coordinate and support responses to and 
recovery from emergencies; collect and disseminate critical information; and seek and obtain 
funding and other aid in support of overall preparedness for the City of Richmond. The Office of 
Emergency Management provides resources and knowledge in four major areas: Preparedness, 
Response, Recovery and Mitigation 
(http://www.richmondgov.com/fire/EmergencyManagement.aspx, accessed 3/21/11).” 
 
Richmond Ambulance Authority  
The mission of the Richmond Ambulance Authority is, “to provide the patients it serves and the 
residents of Richmond with emergency and non-emergency ambulance service by practicing 
clinical excellence with superb response time performance while maintaining its commitment to 
economic efficiency and minimal tax subsidization (http://www.raaems.org/, accessed 3/21/11).” 
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Richmond Regional Planning District Commission (RRPDC) 
The RRPDC is a regional planning agency whose mission is, "to strengthen the quality of life 
throughout the Richmond region by serving as a regional forum of member local governments to 
address issues of regional significance, providing technical assistance to localities, and 
promoting and enhancing the collective consensus on the economic, transportation, social, 
environmental, and demographic interests of the region 
(http://www.richmondregional.org/About_Us/about_us.htm, accessed 4/14/11).” 
 
American Red Cross 
“The American Red Cross has been the nation's premier emergency response organization. As 
part of a worldwide movement that offers neutral humanitarian care to the victims of war, the 
American Red Cross distinguishes itself by also aiding victims of devastating natural disasters. 
Over the years, the organization has expanded its services, always with the aim of preventing and 
relieving suffering (http://www.redcross.org, accessed 2/27/11).” 
 
The Salvation Army, Disaster Relief Services Program 
“The Salvation Army, an international movement, is an evangelical part of the universal 
Christian Church.  The core of The Salvation Army's disaster program consists of several basic 
services. And while these services address many of the typical needs of a disaster survivor, 
Salvation Army disaster relief is also flexible. Our services are adapted to the specific needs of 
individuals and communities and scalable according to the magnitude of the disaster 
(http://disaster.salvationarmyusa.org/, accessed 2/27/11).” 
 
Virginia Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) 
“VA VOAD was formed in order to enhance and support the response of non-governmental 
agencies during an event within the Commonwealth of Virginia.  
VOAD connects faith-based and non-profit agencies that respond during disasters and 
emergencies with the Department of Emergency Management, the EOC and FEMA in order 
to better coordinate response and recovery during an event. This coordination allows agencies to 
better communicate as well as manage assets and resources. 
http://vavoad.org/index.html, 2/27/11).” 
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Emergency Support Functions (ESF) 
ESF # Scope of Activity 
1 Transportation Aviation/airspace management and control, Transpotation safety, 
Restoration/recovery of infrastructure, Movement restrictions, Damage 
and impact assessment 
2 Communications Coordination with telecommunications and information technology 
industries, Restoration and repair of telecommunications infrastructure, 
Protection/restoration/sustainment of national cyber and information 
technology resources, Oversight of communications within the Federal 
incident management and response structures 
3 Public Works and 
Engineering 
Infrastructure protection and emergency repair, Infrastructure restoration, 
Engineering services and construction management, Emergency contracting 
support for life-saving and life-sustaining services 
4 Firefighting Coordination of Federal firefighting activities, Support to 
wildland/rural/urban firefighting operations 
5 Emergency Management Coordination of incident management and response efforts, Issuance of 
mission assignments, Resource and human capital, Incident action planning, 
Financial management 
6 Mass Care, Emergency 
Assistance, Housing, and 
Human Services 
Mass care, Emergency assistance, Disaster housing, Human services 
7 Logistics Management and 
Resource Support 
Comprehensive, national incident logistics 
planning/management/sustainment capability, Resource support (facility 
space, office equipment and supplies, contracting services, etc.) 
8 Public Health and Medical 
Services 
Public health, Medical, Mental health services, Mass fatality management 
9 Search and Rescue Life-saving assistance, Search and rescue operations 
10 Oil and Hazardous Materials 
Response 
Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, biological, radiological, etc.) 
response, Environmental short- and long-term cleanup  
11 Agriculture and Natural 
Resources 
Nutrition assistance, Animal/plant disease/pest response, Food safety and 
security, Natural/cultural resources and historic properties 
protection/restoration, Safety and well-being of household pets 
12 Energy Energy infrastructure assessment/repair/restoration, Energy industry 
utilities coordination, Energy forecast 
13 Public Safety and Security Facility/resource security, Security planning/technical resource assistance, 
Public safety/security support, Support to access/traffic/crowd control 
14 Long-Term Community 
Recovery 
Social/economic community impact assessment, Long-term community 
recovery assistance to States/local government/private sector, 
Analysis/review of mitigation program implementation 
15 External Affairs Emergency public information/protective action guidance, 
Media/community relations, Congressional/international affairs, 
Tribal/insular affairs 
Source: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-intro.pdf 
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